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CURBING FRANCHISE FREE AGENCY: THE
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FRANCHISE
RELOCATION ACT OF 1998
INTRODUCTION

Rooting for the home team is not as easy as it used to be. The
recent move of the Cleveland Browns to Baltimore, along with the
prior moves of the Cardinals from St. Louis to Phoenix, of the
Colts from Baltimore to Indianapolis, and of the Oilers from
Houston to Tennessee, have separated fans from their National
Football League home teams,' destroying natural team rivalries and
creating fan animosity and distrust towards the League and the
individual teams' owners. Unfortunately, professional football is
not the only endangered sports enterprise. Other professional
sports, such as hockey, basketball and soccer are similarly affected.
For example, professional basketball has contributed to the
problem with the departure of the New Orleans Jazz for Utah.2
Meanwhile, professional baseball fans recently would have seen
the Pirates exit Pittsburgh, but for baseball's exemption from
antitrust laws and the corresponding ability of baseball's American
and National Leagues to control franchise moves.3
The recent proliferation of franchise relocations destroys team
rivalries and incites the animosity of fans.4 However, it has a more
politically salient component: it inflicts financial loss on the cities
involved.5 The existence of a professional sports franchise lends a
city status as a "big-league city," thereby creating numerous
commercial opportunities and thousands of jobs in hospitality and
services. 6 Furthermore, the loss of a franchise undermines
significant public investments associated with professional sports
facilities in the form of state and local tax subsidies provided for
1. See 142 Cong. Rec. 2329 (1996) (remarks of Sen. Arlen Specter).
2. Tiffany Danitz, Can New Laws Level the Field?, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS,

August 3, 1998, at p. 12.
3. See 142 Cong. Rec. 2329 (1996) (remarks of Sen. Arlen Specter).
4. Danitz, supra note 2, at 12.
5. See 142 Cong. Rec. 2329 (1996) (remarks of Sen. Arlen Specter).
6. Id.
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the construction and improvement of stadia and infrastructure.
Inevitably, the continued increase in sports franchise relocation
will threaten both the loyalty of sports' fans and the stability of
professional sports in general.7
The problem of franchise relocation may find its solution in the
most recent of a series of bills regarding this issue introduced in
the 1050 Congress. This bill, introduced by Representative Martin
Meehan of Massachusetts on May 7, 1998 and subsequently
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Commerce, seeks to exempt professional sports leagues from
liability under antitrust laws for restricting the relocation of a
member team.8 The bill suggests procedural requirements for
league evaluation of relocation requests and establishes criteria for
making this assessment.'
As a result of this legislation,
professional sports leagues will be entitled to limit or refuse
relocation without threat of antitrust litigation while "interested
parties," such as political entities within affected cities, will have
the opportunity to seek judicial review of a league's
determination.' °
This update will begin by briefly discussing both the legislative
basis for disallowing league restriction of team relocation and the
recent case law that suggests that a league has the authority to
prevent a professional sports team from relocating from one
community to another. Next, it will discuss Congressional
findings and prior Congressional attempts to formulate legislation
that would exempt leagues from antitrust violation. Finally, this
update will explain and analyze the "Professional Sports Franchise
Relocation Act of 1998." It will seek to describe why this
proposed legislation is essential to the protection of the
entertainment interests of sports fans and to the promotion of
stability in professional sports.

7. Id.
8. H. R. 3817, 105th Cong. (1998).

9. Id.
10. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/7
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I. BACKGROUND

A. Antitrust Limitations
Restrictions on professional sports leagues as to the inclusion
and relocation of member teams have been generated by judicial
interpretations of the Sherman Act. This antitrust legislation
prohibits the formation of "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states... ."" Affected parties, such as
team owners, may seek treble damages for a violation of this
provision. 2 Professional sports leagues, with the exception of
professional baseball, 3 generally are prohibited from placing
restrictions on the sports industry as a result of these laws. 4
However, Congress has created exceptions to this rule, and
generally has been willing to legislate in the best interests of
professional sports. First, in 1961, Congress granted certain sports
leagues a limited exception from the antitrust laws with respect to
the joint sale of television broadcast rights for league games. 5
This exception was limited; it did not apply to any other activities
of those engaged in professional sports.1 6 Second, in 1966,
Congress permitted "a joint agreement by which the members of
two or more football leagues combine their operations in
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1998).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1998).
13. See generally Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (the judicially created
exception of professional baseball and its reserve system from federal antitrust
laws is a matter for Congress and will not be overturned by the courts). Since
this decision, Congress has passed the Curt Flood Act of 1998, giving major
league baseball players protection under federal antitrust laws and effectively
eliminating baseball's limited antitrust exemption. S.53, 105th Cong. (1998).
14. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)
(subjecting professional football to antitrust laws); Shayne v. National Hockey
League, 504 F. Supp. 1023 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding that professional hockey is
engaged in interstate commerce and therefore subject to antitrust laws);
Haywood v. National Basketball Association, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (finding
that basketball enjoys no exception from federal antitrust laws).
15. Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 775 (3rd
Cir. 1983) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1291).
Published16.
byId.
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expanded single leagues... if such agreement increases rather than
decreases the number of professional football clubs so operating."17
This amendment was limited in that it merely allowed the
combination of members of two or more leagues into one.18 In
addition to these antitrust exceptions, professional sports teams
have also been the direct beneficiaries of federal legislation. The
benefits included the following: a prohibition of local television
blackouts of network games which were sold out at least 72 hours
in advance,19 and various federal tax laws that allow depreciation
of player contracts, capital gains, carryover losses, and the
formation of Subchapter S corporations.2"
In order for an "agreement" or "conspiracy" to exist under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it is implied that two or more
individuals must be acting in concert.2 ' This raises the question of
whether a professional sports league is a "single entity," implicitly
incapable of forming a contract, combination, or conspiracy alone
in restraint of trade.22 The National Football League made this
argument in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v.
National FootballLeague.23 It contended that its league structure
deems it a single entity, likened to a partnership or joint venture,
and therefore it should not be subject to Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.24 The 9t' Circuit rejected this argument, noting that the league
functions in the promotion of individual teams. 2' The NFL clubs
are seen as separate business entities, to be distinguished from
partnerships and joint ventures in that they are independently
owned and do not share profits and losses.26
17. Id. (referring to the Football Merger Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80
Stat. 1508).
18. Id.
19. H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995) (citing Pub. L. No. 93-107, 87 Stat.
350).
20. H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).

21. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1998).
22. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Raiders1].

23. Id.
24. Id. at 1389.
25. Id.
26. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/7
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While it seems as if Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits
every agreement, conspiracy, or other concerted activity in restraint
of trade, courts will not invalidate every such agreement in keeping
with what they view to be Congressional intent." Courts have,
instead, adopted analysis under "rule of reason," requiring the fact
finder to decide whether, under all the circumstances of the case,
the agreement imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition."
The positive and negative effects on trade will be balanced after
the plaintiff establishes a cause of action by establishing three
threshold elements: (1) an agreement among two or more persons
or business entities; (2) intent to harm or unreasonably restrain
competition; and (3) actual injury to competition.29 Despite this
flexible approach, some restraints are held to be per se
unreasonable." When judicial experience with a particular kind of
restraint enables a court to predict with certainty that the rule of
reason will condemn that restraint, the court will hold that the
restraint is per se unlawful.31 It is uncertain at this time whether a
league's restriction on the right to relocate a franchise is per se
unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, there are
at least two federal court decisions that may imply that a league
has the authority to prevent a team from relocating under certain
circumstances.
B. Raiders I
Prior to 1978, the Los Angeles Coliseum was the home of the
Los Angeles Rams. The coliseum was left without a tenant,
however, when the owner of the Rams decided to relocate his team
to Anaheim, California. 2 The owners of the L.A. coliseum
27. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1386 (citing United States v. Joint Traffic Assn.,
171 U.S. 505 (1898)).
28. Id. at 1386 (citing Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457

U.S. 332 (1982)).
29. Id. at 1391 (citing Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 290 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
30. Id. at 1386 (citingStandard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S.
1(1911)).
31. Id. (citingUnited States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)).
Published32.
by Raiders
Via Sapientiae,
2016at 1384.
I, 726 F.2d
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inquired with the NFL about locating an expansion franchise in
Los Angeles, but were told it would not be possible at the time.33
In its attempt to convince another team to move, the stadium
officials ran into an obstacle in Rule 4.3 of Article IV of the NFL
Constitution. 34 At that time, Rule 4.3 required unanimous
approval35 of the 28 member teams when a team sought to relocate
to the home territory of another team.36 Even though the owner of
the Oakland Raiders was willing to move his team to Los Angeles,
the members of the NFL unanimously voted to refuse the
relocation request.37 The Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Commission then instigated legal action against the NFL, claiming
that Rule 4.3 was illegal under antitrust laws.38
The court used "rule of reason" analysis to determine whether
Rule 4.3 "reasonably serves the legitimate collective concerns of
the owners or instead permits them to reap excess profits at the
expense of the consuming public., 39 It determined that the owners
had a legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of the league
and that the exceptional nature of the industry requires some
territorial restrictions in order to encourage participation in the
venture and to secure each member team "legitimate fruits of that
participation."4 However, the court concluded that a jury could
reasonably find Rule 4.3 to be a violation of antitrust laws because
a less restrictive measure could have been employed by the
league." Even though the court ruled against the NFL in this case,
it limited its decision to the Raiders' move to Los Angeles, and
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Pursuant to a 1978 amendment, Rule 4.3 was amended so as to require
only a three-fourths affirmative vote to allow a team to relocate into the "home
territory" of a member team.
36. Id. Rule 4.1 of the NFL Constitution describes "home territory" as the
city in which the club holds its home games along with the 75 miles in each
direction. In this case, the L.A. Coliseum was still in the "home territory" of the
Rams.
37. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1385.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1392.
40. Id. at 1396.
41. Id. at 1397.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/7
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laid the foundation for an argument against applying antitrust laws
in this context.
C. NBA v. SDC Basketball Club42
The San Diego Clippers Basketball Club is a member of the
National Basketball Association. Its owner moved the club to Los
Angeles without obtaining league permission.43 The league
acquiesced at the time, believing that the decision in Raiders I
precluded any league interference with franchise relocation.'
Following the move, the NBA began proceedings to adopt a new
rule governing its consideration of franchise moves, and brought
suit against the Clippers for failing to seek league approval for its
relocation.45 The Clippers, along with the Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Commission, counter-claimed with the argument that the
league's approval provision violated Section 1 of the Sherman
6

Act.1

The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's grant of
summary judgment to the Clippers and remanded the case for
consideration of material facts.47 In its reasoning, the court
emphasized the narrow holding of Raiders I, reasserting that the
decision invalidated league restrictions on member teams'
relocation only as applied to the Raiders' move to Los Angeles.4 8
It rejected the notion that Raiders I invalidates any and all
restrictions on franchise movements, and implied that restrictions
are permissible so long as they are "closely tailored" to effectuate
the league's interests.4 9 The case was remanded to enable the
district court to examine three issues of material fact relevant to the
finding of an antitrust violation: 1) the purpose of the restraint as
demonstrated by the NBA's use of a variety of criteria in
evaluating franchise movement; 2) the relevant market said to
42. 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987).
43. Id. at 564.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 565.
47. NBA, 815 F.2d at 570.
48. Id. at 567.
49. Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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have been affected by the relocation restrictions; and 3) the actual
effects of the restrictions on trade."
The court in Raiders , in its finding that Section 4.3 of the
NFL's Constitution violated antitrust laws, suggested to the NFL
that, to the extent it finds the law inadequate, it would have to look
to Congress for relief." Conversely, the Court of Appeals in the
NBA's case suggested that the lower courts consider three factual
matters before finding an antitrust violation in this context. The
first of these factors, the existence of various criteria in evaluating
a future franchise relocation, plays a prominent role in much of the
subsequent proposed federal legislation. The ultimate effect of
these two cases was to alert Congress of the need to provide
legislative remedy to the problems created by unfettered
professional sports franchise relocation and to create predictability
and consistency in the application of antitrust laws to professional
sports.
D. Congressional "Findings"
In its attempts over the last five years to remedy the problems
inherent in sports franchise relocation and to propose legislation
creating an antitrust exemption for leagues under such
circumstances, Congress has identified many relevant and viable
issues justifying its intervention. The first, and most important,
finding is that professional sports teams travel in interstate
commerce to compete, utilize materials shipped in interstate
commerce, and broadcast games nationally.12 This establishes that
Congress has the authority to regulate professional sports through
its powers under the Commerce Clause. Nine of the most common
of Congress' additional findings are as follows:
(1) Professional sports teams foster a strong local
identity with the people of the cities and regions in

50. Id. at 568.
51. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1399.
52. Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1996, S. 1625, 104th
Cong. § 2 (1996).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/7
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which they are located, providing a source of civic pride
for their supporters;53
(2) Teams provide employment opportunities,
revenues, and a valuable form of entertainment for the
cities and regions in which they are located;54
(3) It is in the public interest to encourage
professional sports leagues to operate under policies
that promote stability among their member teams and to
promote the equitable resolution of disputes arising
from the proposed relocation of professional sports
55
teams;
(4) Communities, sports fans, and taxpayers make a
substantial and valuable financial, psychological, and
emotional investment in their teams and their teams'
S6
names;
(5) Professional
sports
teams
remain
in
communities for generations and represent much more
than a business; 7
(6) Current law does not protect the rights of sports
fans nor the interests of communities when a
professional sports franchise decides to relocate; 8
(7) Professional sports teams' owners are positioned
to extract enormous benefits from communities, and
they are taking advantage of these opportunities; 9
(8) Professional sports teams and leagues have
directly benefited from federal legislation;" and

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Fan Freedom and Community Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 2740, 104th

Cong. § 2 (1995). This proposed law advocated reserving the registered mark

used to identify the team for the community from which the team is relocating.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The bill cites, as examples, the Sports Antitrust Broadcast Act of
1961, 15 U.S.C. 1291, the Football Merger Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80
Stat. 1508; Pub. L. No. 93-107, 87 Stat. 350 (relating to prohibition of local
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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(9) The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled that a league has the authority to prevent a
professional sports franchise from relocating from one
community to another community.6 1
These nine findings demonstrate Congress' intent to equalize the
playing field. The means employed by the proposed legislation is
to take important decision-making authority out of the hands of
individual team owners and place it with the league.62 It is the
individual league which ultimately will be imposed upon to keep
the economic and ideological best interests of the sport paramount.
In addition, the following examples of legislation take into
account the concerns of professional sports fans, as they seek to
protect their interests in professional sports entertainment from the
corporate interests of the franchise owners.
E. Former CongressionalInitiatives
1. ProfessionalSports FranchiseStabilizationAct of 1992
In 1992, Congress made an attempt to free leagues from antitrust
limitations with the Professional Sports Franchise Stabilization Act
of 1992.6 This proposed bill would have made it unlawful for any
professional sports franchise to relocate unless specific
requirements were met.' First, the owner of the franchise had to
provide written notification of his intention to the local
government not less than 120 days before action was to be taken.65
After this notification was received, the owner of the team was
required to negotiate in good faith with the local government to the

television blackouts of network games which were sold out 72 hours in
advance), and various unnamed federal tax laws.
61. H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). The proposed statute cites Raiders I,
726 F.2d 1381, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National
Football League, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1984) (commonly referred to as
"Raiders II"), and National Basketball Association v. SDC Basketball Club Inc.,
815 F.2d 562.
62. H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
63. H.R. 5713, 102nd Cong. (1992) (not enacted).
64. Id at § 2.
65. Id.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/7
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end of avoiding relocation.66 The bill also provided three
additional situations in which a team could relocate: (1) where a
party to the stadium lease agreement fails to comply with a
provision of material significance; (2) where the stadium is found
to be "inadequate," and the stadium authority demonstrates no
attempt to remedy the inadequacies; and (3) where the franchise
has incurred an annual net loss for at least three consecutive years
immediately preceding the proposed location, or has incurred
losses in a shorter period that endanger the financial viability of the
franchise.67
This bill did not explicitly suggest an exemption from antitrust
liability, thus distinguishing it from many similar Congressional
initiatives. In addition, it only provided for civil action on the part
of government authorities.68 The bill was unique in two additional
ways. First, it contained a mandatory provision allowing for
communities to purchase the franchise.69 Second, it disregarded
the various sports leagues' interests in regulating franchise
relocation.7' The leagues, presumably, were not considered parties
to the decision-making process. The proposed effect of this
legislation was to protect the economic and emotional interests of
fans and taxpayers, but, in essence, the result merely would have
been to force the sale of the franchise to local governments,
thereby undermining the rights of team owners and the
responsibilities of the sports leagues. The bill would have done
little more than provide for a local government's opportunity to
purchase a franchise - an opportunity that already exists. It was
inadequate without an explicit antitrust exemption and recognition
of the leagues' interests in respect to franchise relocation. The
Professional Sports Franchise Stabilization Act of 1992 was not
enacted by Congress.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. H.R. 5713, 102nd Cong. § 3 (1992).
69. Id.
70.
Id.Sapientiae, 2016
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2. Fans Rights Act of 1995
Another attempt of Congress to limit sports franchise relocation
was the Fans Rights Act of 1995.71 This proposed legislation
differed from the 1992 Act in that it exempted professional sports
leagues from antitrust laws when enforcing rules regarding
franchise relocation.7' It also differed in that it described, in detail,
the criteria to be used by the league in making such a
determination, including but not limited to the demonstration of
fan loyalty, the existence of net operating losses and the degree to
which the owner of the team had engaged in good faith
negotiations with appropriate individuals to maintain the status
quo. 73 Like the Professional Sports Stabilization Act, this proposal
required notice and provided the opportunity for a government
entity to purchase the franchise.74 This Act required 180 days
notice, along with publication in one or more newspapers of
75
general circulation.
The Fans Rights Act addressed the issue of franchise relocation
more adequately than the 1992 proposed Act would have,
particularly because it identified the professional league as the
party responsible for relocation determinations.76 In addition, it
provided for a necessary antitrust exemption and provided
examples of relevant criteria to be used in deciding whether to
allow a team to relocate.77 This bill was an example of an attempt
to balance the rights and interests of communities, owners and
professional leagues.
It sought to serve the interests of
communities by allowing government entities to purchase a
franchise prior to its move.7' Additionally, while recognizing the
professional leagues as decision-making bodies, it protected the
71. S. 1439, 104th Cong. (1995).
72. Id. at § 4.
73. Id.
74. S. 1439, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995).
75. Id.
76. See also S. 1625, 104th Cong. (1996), S. 1696, 104th Cong. (1996) and
S. 1767, 104th Cong. (1996). These bills are virtually identical to the Fans
Rights Act, S. 1439, 104th Cong. (1995).
77. S. 1439, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995).
78. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/7
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rights of the owners by limiting the scope of its application through
the consistency of enumerated criteria. The last congressional
action on the Fans Rights Act of 1995 was a referral to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on
November 30, 1995.
3. Fan Freedom and Community ProtectionAct of 1995
Congress made its next attempt to limit franchise relocation with
the Fan Freedom and Community Protection Act of 1995. 79 This
bill was notable in two respects. First, it contained a provision
under which the registered mark that was used to identify the team
would become the property of the league."0 The league then was to
reserve the registered mark for use only by the community from
which the team was relocating, either until the registered mark
expired or until the community informed the league that a
professional sports team would not be using the mark.81
Furthermore, the registered mark, or any portion of the registered
mark, could not be used by another professional sports team in the
same league.82 This was a unique attempt by Congress to protect
the intellectual property rights of cities in their teams' registered
trademarks.
The second notable aspect of this bill is that it sought to impose
a requirement on leagues to make expansion teams available to
communities that meet certain conditions.83 The expansion
franchise was to be made available from the league within one year
of the submission of the name of an investor at a fee no greater
than 85 percent of the franchise fee charged by the league for the
last expansion team. The three requirements for a city to obtain
an expansion franchise were as follows: (1) the league must
approve the relocation of a professional sports team from one
community to another; (2) not later than three years after the
relocation, the community in which the team was previously
79. H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. (1995).
80. Idat § 3.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995).
84. Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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located must submit the name of an investor to the league; and (3)
the investor must demonstrate that he is financially able to
purchase and support the team by placing the amount of the
franchise fee and an amount equal to the sale price of the last
professional sports team in an escrow account."
This bill, in addition to providing an antitrust exemption and an
enumeration of criteria to be used in evaluating the proposed
relocation of a franchise, allowed for maintenance of a team's
registered mark and suggested a remedy for relocation that went
beyond judicial review of the league's determination.86 By
allowing a community to retain the registered mark and to obtain
an expansion franchise within three years of the loss of its "home
team," Congress was, in essence, allowing the community to
reclaim what it has lost. It had the opportunity to fill its stadium
with new players under the same team logo and identity, almost as
if the team had never left, thus allowing fans to continue to identify
with their "original" home team.87 The last action taken by
Congress on the Fan Freedom and Community Protection Act of
1995 was a report from the House Committee on the Judiciary on
July 8, 1996.
II. THE PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FRANCHISE RELOCATION ACT OF
1998
The most recent congressional attempt at limiting professional
sports franchise relocation is the Professional Sports Franchise
Relocation Act of 1998.88 This bill, as introduced, will apply an
antitrust exemption to professional football, basketball, soccer and
hockey leagues when they issue or enforce rules restricting the
relocation of member teams.89 It seeks to provide procedural
requirements for franchise relocation and judicial review of a
league's determination to "interested parties."9 The bill describes
"interested parties" as a member team, a stadium owner or
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995).
88. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. (1998).
89. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998).
90. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 5 (1998).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/7
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operator, a representative of a political subdivision with geographic
jurisdiction over the stadium, any legislature that has provided
financial assistance to team facilities and "any other person who is
determined by the sports league of the member team to be an
affected party."'"
The 1998 Act consists of three primary
provisions: 1) requests for approval of franchise moves; 2) criteria
for approval of relocation; and 3) judicial review.
A. Requestsfor Approval
H.R. 3817 will require any individual who seeks to change the
home territory of a team to submit written notice to the league at
least 210 days prior to the beginning of the sport's season. 2 This
request must be in writing and delivered in person or by certified
mail to each "interested party" at least 30 days after the request
was submitted to the sports league.93 It must contain the date of the
proposed change, a summary of the reasons for the change, and a
detailed description of the requirements of this Act, including
notice of the relief available to interested parties.94 In addition, the
request must be made available to the news media and must be
published in at least one newspaper of general circulation in the
home territory of the team seeking relocation, presumably to offer
interested parties not privy to prior negotiations notice of their
rights to relief.95
B. Criteriafor Approval
While each individual league is to be responsible for establishing
its own procedures for the approval or disapproval of relocation
requests, H.R. 3817 will make it mandatory that the league base
their decisions on pre-existing criteria made available to all
interested parties at their request.9 6 Congress enumerated ten such
criteria that must be taken into consideration in addition to any
criteria the leagues themselves develop:
91. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998).
92. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 4 (1998).

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
Published96.
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(1) The extent to which fan loyalty has been
demonstrated during the tenure of the member team in
the home territory (this is to be determined by fan
attendance, ticket sales, and television ratings);97
(2) The degree to which the owner of the member
team has engaged in good faith negotiations enabling
the team to retain its present location;98
(3) The degree to which the ownership or
management of the member team has contributed to any
circumstance that might demonstrate the need for
99
relocation;
(4) The extent to which the team has been a
beneficiary of public support by means of any publicly
financed playing
facility, rent abatement or special tax
I °°
treatment;
(5) The adequacy of the stadium or arena of the
team and the willingness of authorities to remedy any
deficiencies;'0 '
(6) Whether the team has incurred net operating
losses, exclusive of depreciation or amortization,
0 2
sufficient to threaten its financial viability;1
(7) Whether any other member team in the league is
located in the home territory of the team requesting
0 3
relocation;
(8) Whether the member team wishes to relocate to
a territory in which no other team in the league is
10 4
located;
(9) Whether the stadium or arena authority, if
public, is opposed to relocation;" 5 and
97. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 4 (1998).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 4 (1998).
104. Id.
105. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/7
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(10) The effect that relocation will have on contracts,
agreements and understandings between the member
team and public and private parties." 6
Once the league has ensured that its requirements have been
satisfied, it must conduct a meeting in which interested parties may
submit testimony." 7 No later than five days after a decision is
made, the league must provide written notice to all interested
parties and to the news media detailing the league's decision,
requirements and remedies available.0 '
C. JudicialReview
Generally, judicial review of a league's compliance with this Act
is available to any "interested party" through civil action."0 9 The
"interested party" must seek judicial review within 21 days of
publication of the league's decision to allow or disallow relocation,
and may not commence action in any judicial district containing
either the home territory or the proposed location of the member
team. 10 If a plaintiff succeeds in civil action, the court then has the
option to vacate the league's decision to relocate the franchise or to
refuse approval or disapproval of the request until the league
complies with this legislation.'
III. IMPACT

The Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1998 will
be beneficial to professional sports. It's negative effects include a
possible decline in the quality of play (due to an incentive toward
league expansion), interference with contractual relationships and
the potential to lock team owners into less preferable facilities and
locations.' 1 2
The positive effects, including procedural
predictability and the capability to limit the current tide of
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 4 (1998).
109. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 5 (1998).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. H.R. Rep. No. 104-656 (House Committee on the Judiciary, reporting
Published
by Fan
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Freedom and
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franchise relocations,"' ultimately will outweigh the negative,
making this Act a necessary tool in preserving the integrity of
professional sports.
A. PositiveEffects
Protection of the entertainment interests of fans and the
promotion of stability in professional sports are both valid
concerns and important legislative goals. The Professional Sports
Franchise Relocation Act of 1998 will ultimately effectuate those
interests. First, the Act contains the necessary antitrust exemption
for football, basketball, soccer, and hockey. 114 Without this
legislative exemption, enforcement of the Act would be impeded
by limitless litigation and its subsequent appeals. Second, this
proposed legislation acknowledges the professional leagues'
interests in regulating franchise relocation in a way that previous
proposed legislation has not. While acknowledging that vital
decision-making authority must be placed with the individual
leagues, the Act also attempts to balance this authority with the
interests of cities and team owners by making judicial remedies
available to both.'15 Under the Act, political subdivisions, along
with team owners and member teams, are labeled "interested
parties""' 6 and are therefore given the opportunity to seek judicial
review of a league's compliance with the Act." 7 If an affected
party feels that the league's decision in approving or disapproving
a team's relocation request is arbitrary or in violation of this act, it
can have that decision vacated by the courts, or have the courts
enjoin the league from approving or disapproving such a request
until compliance with the Act is determined." 8 This provision
successfully balances the interests of team owners with those of the
fans, by granting fans and cities limits on franchise expansion and

113. Id.
114. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998).
115. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 5 (1998).
116. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998).
117. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 5 (1998).
118. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/7
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by granting team owners the opportunity to seek judicial review of
a league's decision." 9
While these two aspects of the Franchise Relocation Act are
important, the most eminent aspects of this bill are found in its
effects on the professional sports enterprise in general. First, the
existence of enumerated criteria to determine franchise relocation
provides both procedural and substantive predictability to team
moves. The Act establishes specific procedural requirements to be
followed before a team can relocate, including time limits on
notice and the methods used to notify all "interested parties" in
advance of the relocation. This will prevent owners from packing
up the team overnight and stealing away under the cover of
darkness - an image, whether accurate or not, most often conjured
up by fans and cities deserted by their home teams."' In addition,
this will effectively prevent team owners from fonning valid
contracts with more generous cities prior to giving notice to current
fans and obtaining approval from the league itself. Substantive
predictability is obtained by including enumerated criteria for the
leagues' decisions.12 1 In this respect, teams must take certain
factors into account, and fans and cities will have advance notice as
to how to protect the existence of their home team before
relocation becomes an issue.
The second, and perhaps most important, effect on professional
sports is the Act's capability of slowing the current tide of
franchise moves.1 2
Similarly, the Act, by limiting franchise
relocation, will produce an incentive for league expansion as a
means for cities to obtain a professional team. 12' This will increase
the number of cities with "big-league status," provide additional
revenue and jobs that go along with the existence of a professional
sports franchise, and promote interest in professional sports

119. Id.
120. Danitz, supra note 2, at 12.
121. H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. § 4 (1998).
122. H.R. Rep. No. 104-656.
123. Id. This will make it more likely that a league will expand its number
of member teams in order to place one with an unrepresented city, as opposed to
simply
teams to
move from one city to another.
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through additional fan loyalties and natural rivalries."' In addition,
this increase in professional sports teams will create a
corresponding increase in the opportunities of players. With more
positions available, athletes will be able to begin their professional
careers earlier and/or prolong them. Athletes that may not have
made it to the professional level in the past will be given that
opportunity once the leagues expand. Ultimately, the probable
effects of the Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1998
promote the goals of professional sports and therefore justify the
bill's enactment into law.
B. Negative Effects
While the incentive of league expansion is likely to create many
benefits to a professional sport, it also has one major drawback.
Despite the increased opportunities to athletes, league expansion is
said by many to reduce the quality of play.'25 By making
professional sports more inclusive, the level of play and the quality
of performance may decline. 26 In addition to this contention, the
Act must face three other valid criticisms. First, there is a
possibility of interference with contractual relationships.'27 The
Act affects the contractual relationship between team owners and
cities concerning location and the amount of public funding put
into stadia and infrastructure. The Act, in a sense, has the effect of
enforcing a non-existent contract between a team's owner and its
"home" city in some cases, while invalidating an otherwise valid
contract between the same owner and a more generous "future
home" city. Second, once a city has lost a team under the Act,
assuming that all of the procedural and substantive requirements
were met by the league, the likelihood that that city will be able to
obtain a future expansion franchise is slim. In this regard, if a city
exhibits that it cannot meet the league's substantive requirements
to keep the franchise - for example, by demonstrating adequate fan
loyalty or by showing a willingness to provide financial support
124. See 142 Cong. Rec. 2329 (1996) (remarks of Sen. Arlen Specter
describing the effects of creating "big-league cities").
125. H.R. Rep. No. 104-656.
126. Id.
127. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/7
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and "adequate" playing facilities - the league will be less likely to
take a risk with the city in the attainment of a future franchise. The
Act can thus be improved upon by including a provision similar to
that in the Fan Freedom and Community Protection Act of 1995,2
making an expansion franchise available from the league
within
12 9
investor.
an
of
name
the
of
submission
the
of
year
one
The third, and most important, criticism of the Franchise
Relocation Act is that may have the potential to lock teams and
their owners into less preferable facilities and locations."' A team
owner, when deciding to relocate the team, is often faced with a
choice between a dissatisfying relationship with the political
entities of a present location and the promise of a new stadium and
increased revenues in a future location. In such a case, the Act
may have the effect of binding the owner to a location and to a
situation in which less income is to be obtained. This may act as a
disincentive to individuals who may, in the future, undertake the
risk of owning and sponsoring a professional sports franchise.
This disincentive may be incredibly harmful to the enterprise of
professional sports, particularly because many teams are owned by
large entertainment-oriented corporations. Many individuals and
corporations will not undertake the risk of managing a team if one
of those risks is a potential legislative block to relocation for
financial gain.
CONCLUSION

The Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1998 is just
the most recent in a series of Congressional attempts to create a
partial antitrust exemption for professional sports. Unfortunately,
the political reality of such a measure invariably sets in opposition
the interests of wealthy team owners and the interests of the
everyday sports fan. Thus, if past experience is any indication,
this bill, while attractive to sports fans and to local political
entities, will garner the support of only a few proactive legislators.
However, if the bill is passed it will benefit professional sports. It
128. H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. (1995).
129. H.R. 2740, 104th Cong § 5 (1995).
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will break the current trend favoring franchise relocation at the
behest of team owners and will produce a corresponding incentive
for league expansion. These positive effects will be felt by the
increasing number of cities capable of maintaining a professional
franchise, as they will have the opportunity to experience the
numerous commercial opportunities that a "big-league city"
enjoys. The Act will protect their financial investments. But
perhaps most importantly, this Act will promote stability in
professional sports while slowing the recent proliferation in
franchise moves that has destroyed team rivalries and incited the
animosity of fans. It will preserve loyalty to our professional
teams and protect the integrity of the games that they play.
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